A Mean Field Game Approach for Distributed Control of Thermostatic Loads Acting in Simultaneous Energy-Frequency Response Markets by De Paola, Antonio et al.
        
Citation for published version:
De Paola, A, Trovato, V, Angeli, D & Strbac, G 2019, 'A Mean Field Game Approach for Distributed Control of
Thermostatic Loads Acting in Simultaneous Energy-Frequency Response Markets', IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid, pp. 1-1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2895247
DOI:
10.1109/TSG.2019.2895247
Publication date:
2019
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
(c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other
users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new
collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this
work in other works
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 23. May. 2019
1A Mean Field Game Approach for Distributed
Control of Thermostatic Loads Acting in
Simultaneous Energy-Frequency Response Markets
Antonio De Paola, Member, IEEE, Vincenzo Trovato, Member, IEEE, David Angeli, Fellow, IEEE
Goran Strbac, Member, IEEE
c©2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or
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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel distributed solution
for the operation of large populations of thermostatically con-
trolled loads (TCLs) providing frequency support. A game-theory
framework is adopted, modelling the TCLs as price-responsive
rational agents that schedule their energy consumption and
allocate frequency response provision in order to minimize their
operational costs. The novelty of this work lies in the use of
mean field games to abstract the complex interactions of large
numbers of TCLs with the grid and in the introduction of an
innovative market structure, envisioning distinct price signals for
electricity and response. Differently from previous approaches,
such prices are not designed ad hoc but are derived instead from
an underlying system scheduling model.
Index Terms—Game theory, distributed control, power system
control, load management, thermal energy storage.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices
τ Index of generation technology
i Time index of integration grid
j Temperature index of integration grid
k Initial temperature index of integration grid
B. Parameters
c1,τ No-load cost of generation technology τ (£/MWh)
c2,τ Linear production cost of generation technology τ
(£/MWh)
c3,τ Quadratic production cost of generation technology τ
(£/MW2h)
rτ Headroom for FR of generation technology τ
sτ FR/dispatch level slope of generation technology τ
Gmaxτ Installed capacity of generation technology τ (MW)
∆GL Loss of generation in frequency event (MW)
D FR damping parameter (s)
∆ fmaxqss Quasi-steady-state frequency constraint (Hz)
∆ frcf Frequency parameter in RoCoF constraint (Hz)
∆ fmax Maximum frequency deviation (Hz)
trcf Time parameter in RoCoF constraint (s)
f0 Nominal frequency (Hz)
hτ Inertia constant of generation technology τ (s)
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hL Inertia of the infeed generation loss (s)
σ Thermal time constant of the TCLs (s)
Toff Ambient temperature (◦C)
ζ Heat exchange parameter of the TCLs (◦C/W)
PON Power consumption of TCL in ON state (W)
TMIN Minimum feasible temperature of TCL (◦C)
TMAX Maximum feasible temperature of TCL (◦C)
tFIN Duration of considered time horizon (h)
N Number of considered TCLs
U0 Aggregate steady-state power of TCLs (MW)
α Discomfort cost parameter (£/h(◦C)2)
T¯ Target temperature of discomfort cost (◦C)
β Anti-synchronization cost parameter (£/h(◦C)2)
∆t Time integration step (s)
∆T Temperature integration step (◦C)
C. Functions
p(·) Electricity price (£/Wh)
ρ(t) Availability fee awarded for FR provision (£/Wh)
UTCL(·) Aggregate power consumption of TCLs (MW)
RTCL(·) Aggregate FR allocated by TCLs (MW)
H(·) Online generation vector
G(·) Generated power vector (MW)
R(·) Vector of frequency response from generators (MW)
U¯(·) Inflexible demand profile (MW)
ϕ(·, ·) Minimized total generation costs per unit of time (£/h)
Rˆ(·) Aggregate system FR (MW)
Hˆ(·) System post-fault inertial response (MW · s2)
T (·) Internal temperature of TCL (◦C)
I(·) Temperature variation of TCL (◦C)
u(·) Power consumption of TCL (W)
f(·, ·) Temperature dynamics of TCL (◦C/s)
λ (·) Fraction of power consumption allocated as FR
r(·, ·) Allocated FR of TCL (W)
J(·) Cost function of TCL (£)
I¯(·) Target temperature variation (◦C)
Ψ(·) Terminal cost function (£)
V (·, ·, ·) Value function for cost-minimization of TCL (£)
u∗(·, ·, ·) Optimal feedback control of TCL (W)
m(·, ·, ·) State distribution of TCLs population
I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of flexible demand-side participation, ther-
mostatically controlled loads (TCLs) such as refrigerators or
air conditioners have been consistently investigated in the last
2few years. The intrinsic flexibility of TCLs has been exploited
to provide several ancillary services and support system op-
eration. For instance, TCLs may perform energy arbitrage [1]
or provide frequency response [2], mitigating severe frequency
deviations due to rare events (e.g. sudden generators outages).
The paper focuses on these two aspects and neglects, for
the time being, other potential TCLs applications such as
balancing mechanisms for frequency regulation [3].
A. Relevant Work
A popular approach to exploit TCL flexibility in power
system operation envisages a cooperative coordination of the
appliances. Under distributed control implementations, previ-
ous works [4], [5] have demonstrated the collective ability
for a populations of TCLs to contain post-fault frequency
deviations. The TCL response in [4] highly depended on
system conditions and it suffered from unintended synchro-
nization and uncontrolled steady-state recovery. Solutions to
these issues eventually reduced the TCL contribution [5].
Other works ([1], [6], [7]) described the TCL population by
means of aggregate models, e.g. a battery-like representation in
[6]. The success of nicely matching aggregate power profiles
with system dynamics was counterbalanced by the need for
a real-time, centralized and (often) bi-directional control to
determine single TCL operation. The stochastic controller in
[8] offered an effective compromise between the advantages of
distributed control and system-oriented goal-setting capability.
The aforementioned cooperative approaches exhibit some
common features: i) they do not ensure an optimal policy
for each TCL, which could be better off by optimizing its
own comfort/cost; ii) they require an intermediate entity (e.g.
aggregators) to translate the TCLs’ flexibility into financial
rewards, iii) they do not fully preserve privacy, as users might
have to divulge their preferences and behavioural patterns.
For all these reasons, competitive schemes have been inves-
tigated for control and optimization of the devices’ operation.
Within this framework, each load responds to pricing/control
signals by selecting the operation strategy that achieves the
best trade-off between costs and comfort of its user.
A market-based approach is considered in [9]–[11], where
flexible loads respond to market prices that arise from unit
commitment/generation scheduling and implicitly account for
the impact of demand response on system operation. A wide
range of solutions, including load saturation [12] and price
corrective mechanisms [13], has been proposed to facilitate
market clearing. Novel pricing mechanisms that account for
investment costs [14] and ad-hoc bidding strategies for flexible
demand integration [15] have also been evaluated.
In parallel, another research stream has investigated game-
theoretical approaches that consider simplified price structures
and instead focus on the competitive interactions between the
loads. The seminal papers [16], [17] have proposed iterative
updates of broadcast price/control signals to achieve a desir-
able coordination of the flexible loads, characterized as a game
equilibrium. These approaches have been recently expanded in
multiple directions, considering for example increased decen-
tralization [18] or reduced iterations [19].
B. Contributions
The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between the
aforementioned research directions on competitive methods
for flexible demand coordination (market and game-based).
In this respect, we propose a novel price-based framework
that combines a detailed modelling of system scheduling and
market prices with a rigorous game-theoretical formulation.
The main contribution of the paper is the application of
mean field games (MFG), a novel analytical tool that is used
to describe the interactions between large populations of TCLs.
These are modelled as rational agents pursuing the minimiza-
tion of their individual operating cost. By approximating the
size of the appliances population as infinite and neglecting
the impact of the single small load (while still accounting
for the effect of the whole population) this approach provides
a scalable and compact characterization for the equilibrium
solution of the TCLs coordination problem. At equilibrium,
the TCLs are applying their best response to specific price
signals and, by doing so, they are inducing those very same
prices in the system.
Mean field games have been previously applied in power
system contexts, considering for example electric vehicles
[20], storage [21] or TCLs [22]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper that implements some
fundamental elements in a mean field game framework:
• Formulation of a multi-objective perspective in which the
agents not only exchange energy with the system but also
provide ancillary services, such as frequency response (FR).
The trade-off between these two (potentially conflicting)
objectives is determined in a purely economic framework:
each TCLs will aim to minimize the difference between the
energy cost and the revenues for FR provision.
• The price signals used for the coordination of the appliances
are derived from a unit commitment (UC) model, rather than
designed ad hoc or obtained through simplified closed-form
expressions [16]–[19]. As a result, the considered prices
accurately reflect the cost of electricity and the value of re-
sponse, accounting for different generation technologies and
detailed FR requirements. As the broadcast prices are equal
for all TCLs, fairness of the proposed scheme is ensured.
• Novel anti-synchronization techniques are introduced to
preserve diversity of the agents’ population and facilitate
convergence to equilibrium through the introduction of aux-
iliary state variables and the design of ad hoc cost functions.
The paper also discusses the distributed methods (based on
iterative price updates) that can be used to converge to the
desired equilibrium solution and presents detailed schemes
for the numerical resolution of the TCLs mean field game
equations. The performance of the proposed approach is then
evaluated in simulation, quantifying the potential value of the
proposed control scheme for the individual agents.
C. Paper Structure
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II describes relevant elements and assumptions of the UC
model and the TCL dynamics. Section III contains the MFG
3formulation, whereas Section IV discusses schemes and al-
gorithms for the numerical resolution of the coordination
problem. Section V discusses the practical implementation of
the proposed strategy and Section VI presents a case study
on a large-scale power system, comparing the results of the
proposed approach with alternative paradigms. Finally, Section
VII contains conclusive remarks.
II. MODELLING
The proposed modelling framework is summarized in Fig. 1.
A population of TCLs is coordinated through the broadcast of
two signals p and ρ , which represent respectively the price of
electricity and the availability fee awarded for FR provision.
In turn, the behaviour of the TCLs is summarized by their
aggregate power consumption UTCL and their total frequency
response RTCL. These quantities modify the UC and therefore
impact the prices p and ρ .
Fig. 1. Diagram of the interactions between TCLs and unit commitment.
A. Unit Commitment
The UC determines generation scheduling decisions (in
terms of energy and FR) in order to minimize the short-
term operating costs of the system. The result of the UC
can be interpreted as the solution of a traditional centralized
market mechanism for energy and FR, if one assumes inelastic
demand and perfect competition [12]. Under this market
framework, the prices of energy and FR broadcast to the TCLs
(p and ρ , respectively) correspond to the relevant Lagrange
multipliers of the UC optimization problem.
For simplicity, a Linear Programming (LP) formulation is
adopted for the UC problem. Considering a generic generation
technology τ and assuming that the size of single plants
included in τ is quite smaller than the aggregate installed
capacity of τ , commitment decisions can be extended to the
fleet and expressed by continuous variables Hτ(t) ∈ [0,1].
Besides a significant reduction in computational time granted
by LP UC rather than binary UC and mixed integer linear
programming (MILP) UC, authors in [23] demonstrated that a
LP model captures, with relatively high precision, all the rele-
vant system-level scheduling requirements, namely generation-
demand balancing and simultaneous allocation of frequency-
related control to deal with fault events.
For consistency with the mean field game formulation pre-
sented in Section III, the proposed deterministic formulation
of the UC problem is time-continuous. To simplify the anal-
ysis, inter-temporal constraints (e.g. generation ramping) are
neglected, allowing to solve the dispatch problem on a instant-
by-instant basis. We wish to emphasize that the distributed
control strategy for coordination of TCLs presented in this
paper can be easily extended to more complex models of UC.
Hence, let Nτ denote the number of generation technologies
available in the system. We indicate by Hτ(t), Gτ(t) and
Rτ(t) the on line generation (as fraction of the total installed
and available capacity), the generated power and the allocated
response of technology τ at time t ∈ [0, tFIN]. The associated
commitment, generation and response vectors are denoted
by H(t) = [H1(t), . . . ,HNτ (t)], G(t) = [G1(t), . . . ,GNτ (t)] and
R(t) = [R1(t), . . . ,RNτ (t)], respectively. In the present analysis,
the allocated response corresponds to the contribution of each
technology to system frequency requirements, i.e. the allocated
power headroom that can be used in case of frequency events.
If the total power consumption and allocated response of the
TCLs at time t are equal to UTCL(t) and RTCL(t), respectively,
the UC at time t can be described through the following
optimization problem:
ϕ(UTCL(t),RTCL(t)) =
min
H(t),G(t),R(t)
Nτ
∑
τ=1
c1,τ ·Hτ(t)Gmaxτ + c2,τ ·Gτ(t)+ c3,τ ·G2τ(t) (1)
with c1,τ [£/MWh] as no-load cost, c2,τ [£/MWh] and c3,τ
[£/MW2h] as production costs. The objective function (1)
corresponds to total generation costs per unit of time and it is
subject to the constraints below:
Nτ
∑
τ=1
Gτ(t)−U¯(t)−UTCL(t) = 0 (2a)
0≤ Hτ(t)≤ 1 (2b)
Rτ(t)− rτ ·Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ (t)≤ 0 (2c)
Rτ(t)− sτ · [Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ (t)−Gτ(t)]≤ 0 (2d)
∆GL−D[U¯(t)+UTCL(t)−RTCL(t)]∆ fmaxqss − Rˆ(t)≤ 0 (2e)
2∆GL · trcf · td− t2rcf · Rˆ(t)−4∆ frcf · td · Hˆ(t)≤ 0 (2f)
q¯(t)− Hˆ(t) · Rˆ(t)≤ 0 (2g)
µ · rτ ·Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ (t)−Gτ(t)≤ 0 (2h)
where (2a) equals generation and aggregated demand (i.e. the
system inelastic demand U¯(t) and the TCL flexible demand
UTCL(t)). The fundamental assumption for LP UC previously
discussed is confirmed by (2b). The amount of response
allocated by each generation technology is limited by the
headroom rτ ·Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ (t) in (2c) and the slope sτ linking
the FR with the dispatch level (2d).
Similarly to [24], the constraints (2e)-(2g) guarantee secure
frequency deviations following the sudden generation loss
∆GL. In particular, (2e) allocates enough FR (with delivery
time td) such that the quasi-steady-state frequency deviation
is above ∆ fmaxqss , with D accounting for the damping effect
introduced by load [24]. As for GB practice on the rate of
change of frequency (RoCoF) limit, it is imposed in (2f) that at
trcf the frequency deviation is above ∆ frcf. For a more compact
notation, we have introduced the aggregate system response Rˆ
and the system post-fault inertial response (IR) Hˆ, defined as
follows:
Rˆ(t) =
Nτ
∑
τ=1
Rτ(t)+RTCL(t) (2i)
4Hˆ(t) =
Nτ
∑
τ=1
hτ ·Hτ(t) ·Gmaxτ −hL∆GL
f0
. (2j)
Relevant quantities in the above expressions include the nom-
inal frequency f0, the inertia constant hτ of technology τ
and the inertia hL of the infeed generation loss (no longer
supporting the system). Finally (2g) constraints the maximum
tolerable frequency deviation ∆ fnad, following the formulation
and methodology presented in [24] and [25]. For a given
system condition at time t (e.g. U¯(t)+UTCL(t), td, ∆GL), there
exists a unique q¯= Rˆ · Hˆ such that |∆ fnadir|= ∆ fmax. Note that
(2g) is a convex function in the range of possible Rˆ and Hˆ.
Hence, we linearize it around n = 10 points xk = (Rˆk, Hˆk),
chosen such that g(Rˆk, Hˆk) = q¯. At low demand conditions
(typically during night hours), (2e)-(2g) would require high
levels of IR and FR. Constraint (2h) prevents trivial unrealistic
solutions that may arise in the proposed LP formulation. In
particular, it avoids high values of committed generation H(t)
in correspondence with low (even zero) generation dispatch
G(t). Such configuration would provide large amounts of
inertial response (proportional to H(t)) and primary response
R(t), but it would most likely violate the threshold for mini-
mum stable generation of the considered plants. To avoid this
undesired outcome, the generation dispatch G(t) must be µ
times higher than the maximum available FR.
Having characterized the minimized operation cost ϕ in (1)
as a function of the current power consumption UTCL(t) and
allocated response RTCL(t) of the TCL population, it is now
possible to introduce the following quantities:
p(t) =
∂ϕ(U,R)
∂U
∣∣∣∣U=UTCL(t)
R=RTCL(t)
ρ(t) =
∂ϕ(U,R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣U=UTCL(t)
R=RTCL(t)
(3)
As mentioned above, the result of the UC can be interpreted
as a market solution. Within this framework, p(t) in (3)
represents the marginal cost of accommodating one additional
unit of demand, which in this specific case corresponds to an
additional unit of power consumption from the TCLs. As a
result, p(t) can be considered as the price of electricity paid
by the TCLs at time t. With a similar reasoning, ρ(t) in (3)
represents the marginal saving of allocating one less unit of
FR, assuming that such response is being provided by the
TCLs instead. It follows that ρ(t) can be interpreted as the
availability price paid to the TCLs for FR provision. The prices
p and ρ in (3) can be expressed as Lagrange multipliers of the
associated constraints in (2) or, equivalently, can be calculated
through a variational sensitivity analysis.
B. Thermostatically controlled loads
A standard first-order dynamical model is used to describe
the time-evolution of the internal temperature T of a TCL:
T˙ (t) = f(T (t),u(t)) =− 1
σ
(T (t)−TOFF +ζu(t)) (4a)
T (0) = T˜ (4b)
where u(t) represents the instantaneous power consumption
of the TCL (either equal to 0 or PON), σ is its thermal time
constant, TOFF is the ambient temperature, ζ incorporates the
physical model of heat exchange (with TOFF−ζu(t) indicating
the asymptotic cooling temperature) and T˜ is the initial TCL
temperature. In addition to T , an additional state variable
I is considered, with I(t) = T (t)− T˜ denoting the variation
of internal TCL temperature in the time interval [0, t]. The
dynamic evolution of I is straightforward to derive:
I˙(t) = T˙ (t) (5a) I(0) = 0. (5b)
The auxiliary state I ensures that multiple TCLs with equal
temperature T (t) at time t remain distinguishable by means
of distinct values of I(t), as long as their initial temperature
T˜ is different. This is crucial to avoid synchronization in the
distributed coordination scheme presented in Section III.
At each time t ∈ [0, tFIN], the single TCL can either be ON
(u(t) = PON) or OFF (u(t) = 0). The maximum amount of FR
r that it can allocate as a result corresponds to:
r(T (t),u(t)) = λ (T (t)) ·u(t) (6)
where λ : [TMIN,TMAX]→ [0,1] is a decreasing function of the
internal temperature T , with λ (TMAX) = 0 and λ (TMIN) = 1.
For simplicity, in the current analysis a linear expression is
considered for λ :
λ (T ) =
T −TMAX
TMIN−TMAX . (7)
The TCL can only provide response if it is ON (u(t) =
PON) and therefore able to reduce its power consumption in
case of a frequency event. The weighting factor λ (T ) accounts
for temperature constraints and ensures that a potential FR
provision (with the TCL being in the OFF state for a certain
time) does not lead to undesirable temperature values.
Remark 1: In the proposed modelling framework, generation
failures and, subsequently, provision of FR by the TCLs are
assumed to be extremely rare. For this reason, the variation in
cost and temperature dynamics associated to such events are
not accounted for in the considered model of normal operation.
This means that all TCLs will always allocate their maximum
available frequency response r, since there is no advantage in
providing less response.
The single TCL is modelled as a self-interested agent that
schedules its power consumption u(·) over a certain time
horizon [0, tFIN] on the basis of the signals p(·) and ρ(·) in (3),
i.e. the current prices of electricity and response availability.
The cost function J minimized by a TCL is expressed as:
J(u(·)) =
∫ tFIN
0
p(t) ·u(t)−ρ(t) · r(T (t),u(t))+
α(T (t)− T¯ )2+β (I(t)− I¯(t))2 dt+Ψ(I(tFIN)), (8)
subject to:
T (0) = T˜ I(0) = 0 (9)
T (t) ∈ [TMIN,TMAX] ∀t ∈ [0, tFIN] (10)
where TMIN and TMAX are the operational temperature bounds
of the considered TCL. Each term in (8) is described in detail:
• p(t) · u(t) (electricity cost): the instantaneous cost asso-
ciated to the power consumption u(t).
5• ρ(t) · r(T (t),u(t)) (response revenue): availability fee
awarded for FR provision. It corresponds to the product
of the availability response price ρ(t) and the allocated
response r(T (t),u(t)) = λ (T (t)) ·u(t).
• α(T (t)− T¯ )2 (T tracking cost): discomfort term penaliz-
ing temperature deviations from some comfort target T¯ .
• β (I(t) − I¯(t))2 (I tracking cost): anti-synchronization
term that quadratically penalizes deviations of the state
variable I from some target signal I¯. It is introduced
to diversify the behaviour of groups of TCLs that have
converged to the same temperature T (t) but have different
initial temperatures T (0) = T˜ and therefore heteroge-
neous values of the state variable I(t) = T (t)− T˜ .
• Ψ(I(tFIN)) (terminal cost function): imposes periodic
constraints, ensuring that the final temperature T (tFIN) of
each TCL is equal to its initial value T˜ . For example, re-
calling that I(t) = T (t)− T˜ , one can choose Ψ(I) =Λ · I2.
We wish to emphasize the multi-objective perspective of the
cost function J: each TCL will not only consider the impact
of its operational strategy u on its energy costs, but it will also
account for the resulting revenues derived from FR allocation
and the discomfort caused by mismatches between the internal
temperature T and its target value T¯ .
III. MEAN-FIELD GAME FORMULATION
The TCLs are modelled as individual players that aim at
minimizing their cost J(u) in (8) and compete between each
other through the changes in prices p and ρ induced by their
operational strategies, i.e. their power consumption u(t). It
is assumed that the single device is sufficiently small not
to significantly impact the system prices. At the same time,
the non-negligible effect of the aggregate strategy of the TCL
population is taken into account. The behaviour of the TCLs
can then be summarized by two coupled partial differential
equations (PDEs) that describe the optimal strategy to be
followed by the devices and their state evolution over time. To
introduce the first equation, the value function V is considered:
V (t,T, I) = min
u(·)
∫ tFIN
t
p(s) ·u(s)−ρ(s) · r(T (s),u(s))+
α(T (s)− T¯ )2+β (I(s)− I¯(s))2 ds+Ψ(I(tFIN)), (11)
subject to (10) and:
T (t) = T I(t) = I. (12)
Note that V , corresponding to the minimized cost sustained
on the time interval [t, tFIN] by a device with state as in (12),
can be characterized as the solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation. Denoting by Vx the partial derivative
of V with respect to the variable x, it holds:
−Vt(t,T, I) = min
u∈{0,PON}
[
p(t)u−ρ(t)r(T,u)+α(T − T¯ )2
+β (I− I¯(t))2+(VT (t,T, I)+VI(t,T, I))f(T,u)
]
(13a)
V (tFIN,T, I) =Ψ(I). (13b)
Following the dynamic programming principle [26], the value
function V is obtained by an integration backward in time,
selecting at each time t the control u that minimizes the right-
hand side of (13a). The boundary condition (13b) straightly
follows from (11) evaluated at t = tFIN. As a result, it is
possible to derive the optimal feedback strategy of the TCLs
for a certain set of price signals (p(·),ρ(·)), defined as a
function u∗(t,T, I) of time instant t and current state (T, I):
u∗(t,T, I) = argmin
u∈{0,PON}
[
p(t)u−ρ(t)r(T,u)+α(T − T¯ )2
+β (I− I¯(t))2+(VT (t,T, I)+VI(t,T, I))f(T,u)
]
(14)
The second PDE is now introduced to characterize the dy-
namic evolution of the TCLs population when each device
acts rationally and applies the optimal feedback strategy u∗.
To this end, let m(t,T, I) denote the state distribution of the de-
vices, with
∫ I2
I1
∫ T2
T1
m(t,T, I)dT dI corresponding to the fraction
of devices with temperature T (t) ∈ [T1,T2] and temperature
variation I(t) ∈ [I1, I2] at time t. The distribution m fulfils the
following transport equation:
mt(t,T, I) =−[m(t,T, I)f(t,u∗(t,T, I))]T
− [m(t,T, I)f(T,u∗(t,T, I))]I (15a)
m(0,T, I) = m0(T ) ·δ (I) (15b)
where δ denotes the Dirac delta function and m0 represents the
initial temperature distribution of the TCLs. Denoted by N the
total number of devices, it is straightforward to characterize
UTCL and RTCL as the following weighted integrals:
UTCL(t) = N
∫ IMAX
IMIN
∫ TMAX
TMIN
u∗(t,E, I)m(t,E, I)dT dI (16a)
RTCL(t) = N
∫ IMAX
IMIN
∫ TMAX
TMIN
r(T,u∗(t,T, I))m(t,T, I)dT dI.
(16b)
The solution of the distributed coordination problem for
large populations of TCLs corresponds to the quantities
(p,ρ,V,u∗,m,UTCL,RTCL) that satisfy the set of equations (3),
(13) - (16). These can be interpreted as a market equilibrium:
the population of TCLs autonomously apply the optimal policy
u∗ in response to the broadcast price signals p and ρ . By
doing so, the associated total power consumption UTCL and
allocated response RTCL induce the very same prices of energy
and response that had been considered in the first place.
IV. NUMERICAL RESOLUTION
A closed-form solution for the coupled PDEs (13) and (15)
may not exist and it is in general difficult to calculate. For this
reason, the equilibrium of the TCLs coordination problem is
calculated through numerical resolution of (1) - (3) and (13)
- (16), as discussed in the rest of this section.
A. Integration Schemes
The mean field game equations (13)-(15) are solved over
a discretized grid of time and temperature values. To avoid
numerical integration issues for the grid points at the border of
the feasibility region, a change of state variables is introduced,
replacing the pair (T, I) with (T, T˜ ). In this equivalent repre-
sentation, the initial temperature T˜ is considered a constant
6state component, with ˙˜T (t) = 0. The original state variable I(t)
can always be derived from the new state as I(t) = T (t)− T˜ (t).
Denoted by ∆t and ∆T the chosen time and temperature
discretization steps, the single grid points are described as:
(ti,Tj, T˜k) = (i∆t,TMIN+ j∆T,TMIN+ k∆T ). (17)
The indexes i = 0,1, . . . , tFIN/∆t, j = 0,1, . . . ,(TMAX −
TMIN)/∆T and k = 0,1, . . . ,(TMAX − TMIN)/∆T are used to
denote the points in the grid that correspond to times t in
the considered time horizon [0, tFIN] and temperature values T
and T˜ in the feasible interval [TMIN,TMAX]. For compactness
of notation, any arbitrary function f evaluated at a certain grid
point (ti,Tj, T˜k) is equivalently denoted as f ij,k.
The schemes adopted for the numerical integration of the
PDEs are now presented. For the HJB equation (13) we have:
V i−1j,k =V
i
j,k+ minu∈U j
(
Lij,k(u)
)
∆t (18)
where U j ⊆ {0,PON} denotes the feasible controls at a certain
temperature Tj and L in the argument of the min function
corresponds to the right-hand side of (13) evaluated on the
discretized grid when a certain control u is applied. For the
function L, the following expressions are considered:
Lij,k(0) =−ρ i · r(Tj,0)+α(Tj− T¯ )2
+β (Tj− T˜k− I¯i)2+
(
V ij+1,k−V ij,k
∆T
)
f(Tj,0). (19a)
Lij,k(PON) = p
iPON−ρ i · r(Tj,PON)+α(Tj− T¯ )2
+β (Tj− T˜k− I¯i)2+
(
V ij,k−V ij−1,k
∆T
)
f(Tj,PON). (19b)
An upwind method [27] is applied in (19): the partial deriva-
tive VT is approximated with forward differences when u= 0
and f(Tj,u)> 0 and with backward differences when u= PON
and f(Tj,u)< 0. This reduces the integration error and avoids
issues at the temperature bounds of the discretized grid. As we
are considering the equivalent (constant) state variable T˜ rather
than I, numerical calculation of VI in (13a) is not necessary.
From (14) the optimal feedback control u∗ on the discretized
time/temperature grid is equal to:
u∗ij,k = argmin
u∈U j
Lij,k(u). (20)
To numerically integrate the transport equation (15), some
preliminary quantities are introduced, denoting by θ( j,k) the
temperature value obtained starting from Tj and applying the
optimal feedback control u∗(t,Tj,Tj− T˜k) for ∆t time. From
(4a), considering a first-order Taylor approximation, it holds:
θ( j,k) = Tj+ f(Tj,u∗(ti,Tj,Tj− T˜k))∆t. (21)
In general, θ( j,k) will correspond to a temperature value
between two adjacent grid points T
¯
γ( j,k) and Tγ¯( j,k). The
indexes
¯
γ( j,k) and γ¯( j,k) have the following expressions:
¯
γ( j,k) =
⌊
θ( j,k)−TMIN
∆T
⌋
γ¯( j,k) =
⌈
θ( j,k)−TMIN
∆T
⌉
(22)
where the angular brackets denote floor and ceiling functions.
The numerical integration of the transport equation (15) can
then be performed as in [21, Section IV], initializing mi at 0
and iterating the following over j and k:
mi
¯
γ( j,k),k = m
i
¯
γ( j,k),k+m
i−1
j,k
[
1−
θ( j,k)−T
¯
γ( j,k)
∆T
]
(23a)
miγ¯( j,k),k = m
i
γ¯( j,k),k+m
i−1
j,k
θ( j,k)−T
¯
γ( j,k)
∆T
(23b)
At each time index i, the updated temperature value θ( j,k)
associated to the grid point (Tj, T˜k) and to the optimal control
u∗(t,Tj,Tj− T˜k) is calculated. In a second step, the fraction of
devices mi−1j,k is repartitioned at the new time index i between
the grid points (
¯
γ( j,k),k) and (γ¯( j,k),k), proportionally to
the proximity of θ( j,k) to T
¯
γ( j,k) and Tγ¯( j,k). This integration
scheme ensures mass conservation of the distribution m and
an accurate representation of average temperature variations.
Canonical schemes, such as the Lax-Friedrich method with
viscosity [28], return comparable results.
B. Resolution Algorithm
The numerical resolution of the system of equations (1)
- (3), (13) - (16) is performed with the iterative approach
detailed in Algorithm 1, solving each single equation and using
the obtained result as a starting point for the next calculations.
Algorithm 1 Distributed price-based coordination of TCLs
1) Initialization. Total power consumption and FR of the
TCLs are set to some initial values U˜TCL and R˜TCL:
U˜TCL(t)←U0 R˜TCL(t)← 0 ∀t ∈ [0, tFIN]. (24)
2) Iterative resolution. Equations are solved sequentially:
a) Solve the UC (1)-(2) for UTCL = U˜TCL, calculating the
associated price signals p˜ and ρ˜ according to (3).
b) Calculate the solution V˜ and u˜∗ of (13) and (14) when
p= p˜ and ρ = ρ˜ , using numerical schemes (18)-(20).
c) Calculate the temperature distribution m˜ according to
(15) when u∗ = u˜∗, using numerical schemes (21)-(23).
d) Evaluate updated estimates UˆTCL and RˆTCL for total
power consumption and response allocation of TCLs
according to (16), assuming u∗ = u˜∗ and m= m˜.
3) Convergence check. Evaluate the error:
e=
∫ tFIN
0
∣∣U˜TCL(t)−UˆTCL(t)∣∣+ ∣∣R˜TCL(t)− RˆTCL(t)∣∣ dt
(25)
IF e> ε . Repeat step 2) with updated values:
U˜TCL← ν ·U˜TCL+(1−ν) ·UˆTCL (26a)
R˜TCL← ν · R˜TCL+(1−ν) · RˆTCL (26b)
ELSE return the (approximate) equilibrium solution:
u∗ = u˜ V = V˜ m= m˜ p= p˜ ρ = ρ˜. (27)
7The UC equations (1) - (3) in step 2.a) are solved at discrete
time instants t = k∆t˜. The time step ∆t˜ is generally greater
or equal than ∆t used in the integration of (13) - (16), with
∆t˜ = η∆t for some η ∈ N. To consistently combine the two
different time steps, the price signals p(t) and ρ(t) calculated
at each t = k∆t˜ are assumed to be constant over the associated
η time samples with step ∆t. Conversely, the signals UTCL and
RTCL are averaged over η time samples with step ∆t in order
to obtain consistent values when ∆t˜ is considered instead.
C. Computational Complexity and Scalability
The operations required for the integration schemes pre-
sented in (18)-(23) are proportional to the number of grid
points defined in (17). As a result, the computational com-
plexity for the numerical integration of the PDEs increases
linearly with respect to a reduction in the time step ∆t and
quadratically when the temperature step ∆T is reduced (as the
latter refers to both state variables T and I - or equivalently
T and T˜ ). The same considerations apply to Algorithm 1, as
this includes iterated applications of the integration schemes
(18)-(23) and of the UC problem (1)-(2), whose complexity
is linear with respect to reductions of the associated time step
∆t˜ and it is not affected by the temperature step ∆T .
We wish to underline the scalability of the proposed reso-
lution method, whose complexity does not explicitly depend
on the number N of considered flexible TCLs. This is ensured
by the chosen mean field game framework, which allows to
characterize the overall behaviour of the devices’ population
with only two quantities: the optimal feedback control u∗ and
the state distribution m. The penetration level of the TCLs will
only affect indirectly the convergence speed of the algorithm.
For higher values of U0, the impact of UTCL and RTCL on the
solution of the UC problem (1)-(2) will be more relevant. As
a result, higher values of ν might be necessary in the update
equation (26), potentially leading to a slower convergence to
equilibrium.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
This section deals with the possibility of deploying the
proposed control strategy in a real-world context, considering
in particular the implementation schemes and the technical
elements required to enable the participation of flexible TCLs
to FR.
A. Implementation schemes
The price-based coordination of the TCLs can be imple-
mented in practice through a bi-directional communication
scheme between the TCLs and some central coordinator (e.g.
the system operator). One effective coordination procedure,
represented in Fig. 2, could strictly follow the individual steps
of Algorithm 1. In this case, the central coordinator would
initially consider some estimate of U˜TCL and R˜TCL, which
characterize the aggregate behaviour of the TCLs population
(Step 1). On the basis of these quantities, it would solve the
UC problem and broadcast to the TCLs the resulting price
signals p˜ and ρ˜ (Step 2.a). In turn, the TCLs respond to the
STEP 2.a
The prices derived 
from the resolution of 
the UC problem are 
broadcast to the TCLs
STEP 2.b
Each TCL determines 
its optimal strategy in 
response to prices
STEP 2.d
The total power 
consumption and 
allocated FR of the 
TCLs is calculated: 
STEP 1
An initial estimate of 
the TCLs aggregate 
behaviour is considered
STEP 3
It is verified if 
equilibrium is 
reached
NO equilibrium: repeat 
calculations with updated
Fig. 2. Iterative implementation scheme for TCLs coordination.
prices by determining their optimal power scheduling u˜∗ (Step
2.b), which they communicate to the central coordinator. In
this practical implementation, Step 2.c of the algorithm can
be bypassed and the central entity can directly calculate the
new aggregate quantities UˆTCL and RˆTCL (Step 2.d). In the
final Step 3, the central coordinator establishes whether the
equilibrium has been reached or a new iteration of Step 2
needs to be performed with updated quantities.
An alternative one-shot implementation strategy, schemati-
cally represented in Fig. 3, can also be considered. In this case,
STEP 3
The prices associated 
to the equilibrium 
solution are broadcast 
to the loads
STEP 4
Each TCL responds to 
prices and determines its 
behaviour at equilibrium
STEP 1
Aggregate information on the TCLs 
population is either estimated or 
received by the central coordinator
STEP 2
The central coordinator 
emulates the coordination 
algorithm and calculates 
the equilibrium solution
Fig. 3. One-shot implementation scheme for TCLs coordination.
it is assumed (Step 1) that the central coordinator has received
(or estimated with sufficient precision), the initial temperature
distribution m0 of the TCLs and the relevant parameters in
their dynamics (4a). In other words, the central entity must
rely on a database of the most relevant TCLs’ models and
quantify their penetration in the system. With this information,
the central entity is able to internally emulate Algorithm 1 and
autonomously calculate the equilibrium solution (Step 2). At
this point, it can directly broadcast the resulting price signals
to the TCLs (Step 3), which can then calculate their optimal
control strategy (Step 4), thus inducing the desired equilibrium
solution in one step. It should be mentioned that this one-shot
algorithm achieves faster convergence at the price of a reduced
customers’ privacy since some information on the TCLs (albeit
in aggregate form) will have to be divulged.
B. Technical requirements
A high-level diagram of the main technical components
and data signals required for participation of flexible TCLs
to an integrated energy-FR market is represented in Fig. 4.
It can be seen that two main additional components need
8Fig. 4. Technical diagram of TCL with smart controller.
to be considered with respect to traditional configurations: a
TCL controller and a smart meter. The TCL controller (by-
passing or in parallel to the regular thermostatic controller)
performs the calculation of the optimal power schedule on the
basis of the received signals and commands the actuator that
switches ON and OFF the TCLs. At the moment, these types
of controllers are still in a prototype phase but it is thought
that, through economies of scale, their price could be as low
as 3£ [4]. In the considered context, a smart meter will also be
required to record the TCLs’ scheduled operation (i.e. profiles
of power consumption and FR allocation/provision), commu-
nicate it to the central coordinator and calculate the associated
energy costs and FR revenues to be claimed. The signals
required and exchanged by the different components to operate
under the envisioned flexible price-responsive paradigm can be
divided in three groups:
1) TCLs’ signals: these include in particular the TCLs’ inter-
nal temperature, used to determine the optimal feedback
control.
2) Distributed signals: (e.g. time, system frequency) re-
quired to detect frequency events and associate them to
the relevant actions and prices.
3) Ad-hoc signals: (e.g. prices, TCLs’ schedule) these are
exchanged between the central entity and the loads and
are required to implement the proposed control strategy.
VI. SIMULATIVE RESULTS
The distributed coordination strategy and resolution tech-
niques presented in Section III and IV are tested in simulation,
considering a typical 2030 scenario of the GB system as in
[24]. The performance of the proposed control strategy is also
compared, in terms of operational costs for the system and
the TCLs, with a cooperative flexible approach and with the
business-as-usual scenario.
A. Case Study
System parameters not yet defined are ∆GL = 1800 MW,
hL = 6 s, D= 1/50 s, f0 = 50 Hz, trcf = 0.5 s, ∆ frcf = 0.5 Hz,
∆ fnad = 0.8 Hz, ∆ fmaxqss = 0.5 Hz and td = 10. The generation
technologies available in the system are nuclear, combined
cycle gas turbines (CCGT), open cycle gas turbines (OCGT)
and wind. Their characteristics are listed in Table I.
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THERMAL AND WIND GENERATION
Nuclear CCGT OCGT Wind
Installed capacity Gmaxτ [MW] 10000 25000 20000 40000
No-load cost c1,τ [£/MWh] 0 7 8 0
Production cost c2,τ [£/MWh] 1 25 50 0.5
Production cost c3,τ [£/MW2h] 0.0005 0.005 0.01 0.0005
Constant of inertia hτ [s] 6 4 4 -
FR headroom rτ - 0.1 0.1 -
FR slope sτ - 0.4 0.5 -
For simplicity, in this work the optimization horizon is
limited to tFIN = 24 h. Hence, the system inelastic demand
U¯ reflects a typical winter work-day profile and, together with
wind realization (green dotted line in Fig. 7a), is taken from
[24]. Further work will extend the optimization horizon (e.g. to
one year) to account for the typical daily/seasonal variability of
wind and demand when calculating TCL operation and value.
It is assumed that a population of N = 2 ·107 fridges with
built-in freeze compartment operates in the system according
to the proposed price-based control scheme. Each device, on
the basis of the received price signals p and ρ , schedules
its power consumption u on the time interval [0, tFIN]. The
initial temperature distribution m0 in (15b) is uniform and
homogeneity of the TCLs is assumed: each fridge has the same
parameters (specified in [29]) and the resulting steady-state
power consumption of the aggregate TCLs is U0 = 790 MW.
Note that the extension of the proposed modelling framework
to the case of a finite number of heterogeneous TCL models
(each with different parameters) is straightforward to imple-
ment through the procedure presented in [21, Section IV].
For the cost function (8) of the individual device, the
terminal cost is chosen as Ψ(I) = ΛI2 with Λ= 0.001£/◦C2,
penalizing quadratically any temperature variation I(tFIN) =
T (tFIN)−T (0). The set-point for the state variable I is defined
as I¯(t) = κ sin(φ t), with κ = 1◦ C and φ = 1 h−1. The choice
of a sinusoidal function for I¯ aims at emulating the normal
variational trend in the TCLs internal temperature, which will
usually oscillate during the day. In this respect, we wish to
emphasize that the sensitivity of the final results with respect to
the parameters κ and φ is significantly low, as discussed at the
end of this section. The remaining cost function parameters are
α = 2 ·10−5£/h(◦C)2, β = 2 ·10−4£/h(◦C)2 and T¯ =−17.5◦C.
B. Market Equilibrium Solution
Algorithm 1 has been applied to the presented scenario,
choosing ∆t˜ = 0.5 h as time step in the resolution of (1)-(3)
and ∆t = 7.5 s and ∆T = 0.15◦ C as discretization steps in (18)
- (23). With ν = 0.95 and ε = 1.5 MWh in the Convergence
check phase, the algorithm terminates after 75 iterations. A
MATLAB environment has been used for the simulations
and the resolution precedure requires about 11 minutes on a
standard laptop HP EliteBook with an Intel(R) i5 CPU (2.60
GhZ) and 8 GB of RAM.
The resulting profile of total power consumption U (n)TCL and
total allocated response R(n)TCL, at different iterations n of the
resolution algorithm, are reported in Fig. 5. The electricity
9prices p(n) and response availability prices ρ(n) (equal to the
Lagrange multipliers of the active constraints (2a) and (2g),
respectively) are shown in Fig. 6. Note that, after some initial
oscillations, convergence is achieved to the equilibrium power
profiles U (75)TCL and R
(75)
TCL (Fig. 5) and to the price signals p
(75)
and ρ(75) (Fig. 6), represented in black. In general, the total
power consumption UTCL is higher during the first hours of
the day, when the electricity price p is lower. The significant
increase of p at about t = 5 h is accompanied by a sharp
reduction of the TCL power consumption at similar times. The
power UTCL then oscillates during the day in order to maintain
feasible levels of the internal temperature T of the TCLs. It can
also be seen that UTCL has a steep decrease starting at about
t = 16 h, when the price p starts to increase consistently over
the 100£/MWh value. The decrease of UTCL continues over
the next three-hour interval of high-price values, including the
price peak at about t = 17 h.
Similarly to UTCL, the aggregate frequency response RTCL
allocated by the TCLs will in general be higher during the
early hours of the day (up to t = 5 h). This will occur because
the power/price relationship between the response availability
fee ρ and the allocated response RTCL is the opposite of
the one between the electricity price p and allocated power
consumption UTCL. In broad terms, RTCL will tend to be high
when ρ is high and will generally be low when ρ is low. Note
that the opposite occurs for UTCL, which is high when the price
p is low. This follows from the different sign of the two price
terms p and ρ in the cost function J of the single load in (8).
In particular, p appears with a plus sign in the cost J because it
represents the price paid by the TCLs for power consumption.
Conversely, ρ is considered with a minus sign since it denotes
the availability fee at which the loads are rewarded for their FR
allocation. When a significant price variation occurs at t = 5
h (with p increasing and ρ decreasing), both UTCL and RTCL
will tend to be lower.
From expression (6), the frequency response r allocated
by each TCL is unequivocally determined by its internal
temperature T and its power consumption u. This means that,
as the TCLs aim at fulfilling their temperature requirements
during the day by consuming power when electricity is cheap,
they will also automatically provide a certain amount of
FR, even at times when the availability fee ρ for response
allocation is low, e.g. after t = 5 h. Moreover, the broad
price/power trends discussed above can be identified only
when the differences and variations in prices are significant.
In general, the behaviour of the TCLs and the associated
aggregate quantities UTCL and RTCL will not only follow the
oscillations of the prices p and ρ but they will also be impacted
by the other cost terms in (8) and by the temperature bounds
presented in (10).
The TCL impact on system commitment decisions and
consequent energy/FR dispatch levels is also analyzed and
displayed in Fig. 7, comparing the case when TCL flexibility
is enabled (solid lines) with a no-flexibility scenario (dashed
lines) where UTCL(t) =U0 and RTCL(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, tFIN].
Fig. 7a shows the generated power from each technology.
Since the TCLs demand is much smaller than inelastic demand
and its variation across the day is limited (see Fig. 5), its
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Fig. 5. Total power consumption U (n)TCL (bold lines) and allocated response
R(n)TCL (dashed lines) at different iterations n of the coordination algorithm.
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Fig. 6. Electricity price p(n) (bold lines) and response availability price ρ(n)
(dashed lines) at different iterations n of the coordination algorithm.
impact on generation is marginal. However, the most notice-
able changes occur during night hours, typically characterized
by higher ancillary services requirements to account for low
inelastic demand. Without TCL support, the optimal solution
envisages a further curtailment of wind output (20.7% more,
i.e. 4 GWh) in favor of an increase in OCGT and CCGT
generation, as wind does not provide IR and FR. In absence
of TCL response, it is necessary to commit and generate
with OCGT, as IR and FR of cheaper CCGT have reached
their maximum values. Note how the active participation of
TCLs facilitates the integration of low-carbon energy, although
this was not the explicit design objective of the proposed
coordination scheme.
Results confirm the interplay between the allocation of IR
and FR, with or without TCL flexibility [24]. In the latter
case, the total FR decreases (dashed vs solid black line in Fig.
7b) while, in parallel, Fig. 7c shows a system-level increase
of committed IR (dashed vs solid black line). Therefore, the
lack of FR from TCLs is not generally compensated by the
10
4 8 12 16 20 24
Time (h)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Po
w
er
 (M
W
)
104
OCGTflex
CCGTflex
Nuclearflex
Windflex
Wind
avail
OCGT
CCGT
Nuclear
Wind
(a) Generation profiles.
4 8 12 16 20 24
Time (h)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Al
lo
ca
te
d 
re
sp
on
se
 (M
W
)
OCGTflex
CCGTflex
TCLflex
OCGT
CCGT
Total
Totalflex
(b) Breakdown of allocated frequency response.
4 8 12 16 20 24
Time (h)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
In
er
tia
 [M
W
/s2
)
Totalflex
Total
OCGT
CCGT
Nuclear
OCGTflex
CCGTflex
Nuclearflex
(c) Breakdown of inertial response.
Fig. 7. Relevant UC quantities when TCL flexibility is enabled (solid lines) and for a no-flexibility scenario (dashed lines).
same amount of FR from other technologies or, conversely,
by more IR while maintaining constant FR from OCGT and
CCGT. Instead, it is the result of a tradeoff between these two
quantities.
Having discussed the aggregate impact of the TCLs popula-
tion on the system through the quantities UTCL and RTCL, the
behaviour of the single loads is now analysed. In particular,
Fig. 8 shows the evolution across time of the internal tempera-
ture T of the individual TCL when the optimal power schedule
u∗ is applied, considering different values of initial temperature
T (0) = T˜ . It can be seen how, through the introduction of
the auxiliary state variable I and associated cost terms in (8),
temperature synchronicity is avoided. TCLs will in general
have different internal temperatures, thus avoiding rebound
peaks in the profiles of UTCL and RTCL, and facilitating
convergence to a final stable configuration. Having chosen a
terminal cost function Ψ that penalizes quadratically the quan-
tity I(tFIN) = T (tFIN))−T (0), the final temperature T (tFIN) of
each TCL will tend to coincide with its initial value T (0).
Fig. 8. Internal temperature T of individual TCLs (each with different initial
temperature T˜ ) when the optimal power schedule u∗ is applied.
Finally, the different cost components for the individual
TCL at the equilibrium solution (as described in Section II-B)
are represented in Fig. 9 as a function of the initial temperature
T (0) = T˜ . Note that the total daily cost (black) sustained by
a single TCL is about 0.05£. As expected, the total cost will
in general be lower for TCLs with lower initial temperature
T˜ . Since λ in (6) is monotone decreasing with respect to
T , devices with lower temperatures in the first hours of the
day (when FR prices are higher) will be able to allocate
more FR and therefore receive higher revenues. It should also
be emphasized that the impact of electricity costs and FR
revenues in (8) is significantly larger than the tracking terms
α(T (t)− T¯ )2 and β (I(t)− I¯(t))2, which have been introduced
to ensure coordination of the devices but do not significantly
change the overall costs sustained by the TCLs. We recall that
the presented results have been obtained with a temperature
variation reference I¯(t) = sin(t). The sensitivity of the results
with respect to I¯(t) has been assessed: the variations in the
price quantities represented in Fig. 9 are negligible (always
below 0.002£) when different amplitude, magnitude and phase
are considered for the sinusoidal reference.
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Fig. 9. Costs breakdown of single TCL as function of initial temperature T˜ .
C. Performance Comparison
The results obtained with the proposed distributed compet-
itive framework (hereby denoted as DCF) are now compared
with two alternative scenarios:
1) Business-as-usual (BAU): the TCLs do not exploit their
flexibility and they operate exclusively according to their
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internal temperature T . They switch ON (u(t) = PON)
when they reach their maximum feasible temperature
TMAX and they switch back OFF again (u(t) = 0) when
they reach the minimum temperature TMIN.
2) Cooperative-Centralized Framework (CCF): the TCLs
are flexible but they do not independently determine
their power consumption profile. This is specified in-
stead by a coordinating entity that centrally determines
the behaviour of the whole population, with the global
objective of optimizing TCLs participation and minimize
the system operational cost. The cooperative coordination
scheme considered in our comparison is the one presented
in [8]. Please note that, in this paper, the term “decen-
tralized” is used to characterize the implementation of the
proposed control strategy, which remains cooperative and
considers a centralized optimization.
The comparison between the three scenarios has initially
considered the total system costs, which are represented in
Fig. 10. As expected, a flexible use of the TCLs in the DCF
BAU DCF CCF
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Fig. 10. Minimized system costs (blue) and payment to TCLs for FR
allocation (red) in the three considered scenarios.
and CCF scenarios can reduce the system generation costs
(blue bars) by about 2% and 2.1%, respectively.
However, for a fair comparison between the three cases, one
should also consider the payments that are made to the TCLs
to reward them for their frequency response allocation (red
bars). In both the DCF and CCF case, these simply correspond
to
∫ tFIN
0 ρ(t)RTCL(t), i.e. the integral over the considered time
horizon of the total response RTCL allocated by the TCLs,
multiplied by the availability fee ρ . Note that, even when
accounting for this additional term, the total system costs are
still lower by 0.4% in the DCF and by 0.6% in the CCF
when compared with the no-flexibility scenario BAU. The
discrepancy in the cost savings corresponds to the so-called
“price of anarchy” of the present set-up, i.e. the degradation
of the whole-system performance when the individual agents
compete between each other rather than cooperate towards
the same high-level objective. We wish to emphasize that the
prosed DCF strategy, albeit exhibiting a slightly higher system
cost when compared to CCF, returns on the other hand a “fair”
market equilibrium where each TCL is satisfied by the final
outcome and cannot further reduce its own cost by modifying
its initially planned strategy.
The three considered scenarios have also been compared
in terms of daily costs sustained by the single TCLs, which
are represented in Fig. 11 as a function of initial temperature
T (0) = T˜ . The calculation of the revenue from FR allocation,
which constitutes a relevant (negative) component of costs,
is different in the three cases. In the BAU scenario, the FR
revenue is zero, since the inflexible TCLs do not provide
frequency support. In the DCF scenario, it is sufficient to
consider the relevant component
∫ tFIN
0 ρ(t)r(T (t),u(t))dt in
(8), whereas in the CCF case the FR revenue corresponds to
1
N
∫ tFIN
0 ρ(t)RTCL(t)dt, i.e. an equal repartition among the N
loads of the total revenues.
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Fig. 11. Daily costs of individual TCLs, as a function of the initial temperature
T˜ , in the three considered scenarios.
It can be seen in Fig. 11 that, in the BAU case, the
costs are more or less constant (since all loads are simply
switching ON and OFF at regular intervals) and higher than
in the DCF and CCF scenarios. In the CCF case, consistently
with the considered cooperative framework, the TCLs costs
have been equally shared among the loads and therefore they
do not depend on the initial temperature T˜ . Conversely, in
the proposed competitive DCF case, the costs are impacted
by T˜ . As previously mentioned, a device with lower initial
temperature will be able to consume more power during the
early hours of the day, when electricity is cheap and there is
significant value in frequency response provision. As a result,
in the cooperative CCF solution, a certain group of TCLs
(the ones with initial temperature below approximatively 18
◦C) will see higher costs than in the DCF case and could, in
principle, modify their schedule to achieve better results.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel approach for distributed price-based
coordination of TCLs has been obtained by combining a rig-
orous mean field game formulation with a detailed modelling
of system UC. As a result, a compact characterization of the
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equilibrium solution for the TCLs coordination problem has
been derived, enabling the provision of ancillary services by
the TCLs and explicitly accounting for different generation
technologies. Practical implementation methods and ad-hoc
anti-synchronization schemes have been designed and tested
in simulation, evaluating the potential benefits of the proposed
control scheme for the single loads and for the overall system.
Future work will focus on a closer integration of TCLs’
operation with other elements of the future smart home. In par-
ticular, the possibility of interacting with renewable generation
(specifically PVs) will be investigated. The proposed analytical
framework will be expanded to quantify the potential cost
reductions obtained by TCLs that preferentially operate when
“free” renewable energy from PVs is available. Interactions
between TCLs and domestic storage will also be explored,
with the purpose of a more effective energy arbitrage that
makes use of storage capacity to overcome power consumption
limitations of the TCLs (caused by their thermal constraints).
A more detailed modelling of system operation in compre-
hensive future energy scenarios will also be analysed. Finally,
stochastic elements will be introduced in the model to account
for exogenous and endogenous uncertainties (e.g. on prices
and on TCL parameters) and to consider alternative control
strategies, such as the use of random transitions by the TCLs
between their ON and OFF state.
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